The Second Time Is Not the Charm
You would think that Israel would have been more cautious in invading Lebanon in 2006, especially given how well that intervention in the 1980s went.
And you would think that having seen how the American pretext of war in Iraq—alleged bad acts by Saddam Hussein—led to an increasingly bloody and useless conflict, the Israeli government might be a tad cautious.
But then you would not be as skeptical of rational-choice theory as we are here. The counterexample of the day is the Israeli government.
Olmert has told the Winograd Commission [that is investigating the 2006 invasion of Lebanon] that his decision to respond to the abduction of soldiers with a broad military operation was made as early as March 2006, four months before last summer's Lebanon war broke out....
Olmert testified before the Winograd Commission on February 1, and its questions focused on three basic issues: the circumstances surrounding Amir Peretz's appointment as defense minister; how and why the decision was made to go to war on July 12, several hours after reservists Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were abducted by Hezbollah guerrillas on the northern border; and why Olmert decided to carry out a large-scale ground operation in Lebanon, 48 hours before the cease-fire, in which 33 soldiers were killed.
